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Abstract
Administered Incentive Pricing (AIP) of radio spectrum as advocated by
Smith/NERA (1996) and recently assessed by Indepen (2003) envisages an
incremental path towards e±cient pricing, with revealed and stated prefer-
ence methods being used to reveal opportunity costs. We build on the latter
to develop and optimal pricing scheme that allows for consumer surplus, in-
terference constraints and their implications for productive e±ciency, revenue
implications and market structure. We demonstrate the subtle relationship
between the interference constraints and the pricing and channel use decisions
of network operators. We proceed to show that the optimal AIP is higher in
sectors where spectrum can be shared and that it acts as Ramsey tax across
sectors of the economy, i.e., is inversely related to the elasticity of demand.
As a special case of our model we examine optimal pricing where the regula-
tor is constrained to ignore the revenue implications. Then optimal spectrum
prices are lower and the relationship between prices and the ability to share
spectrum is reversed.
JEL Classi¯cation: L10, L50, L96
Keywords: radio spectrum, spectrum pricing, administered incentive pric-
ing.
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A Proof of Proposition 1 331 Introduction
Wireless communications services require radio spectrum as a factor of production.
The range of frequencies available is ¯nite so this input, as for other inputs, is a
scarce resource. However, the nature of interference constraints that require dif-
ferent frequencies for some communications, but the possibility of the same shared
frequency for others, gives this input into production a unique characteristic which
has important implications in several areas of radio services. In this paper we focus
on one of these { administered spectrum pricing.1
Until recently spectrum was priced to recover the costs of administering licence
application and licencees. A drive towards more e±cient use and valuation of spec-
trum led to Smith/NERA's \administered incentive pricing" (AIP) scheme in 1996.
As a recent Indepen (2003) report makes clear, this attempts to price spectrum
on the basis of opportunity cost across its alternative uses|the original idea here
dates back to Levin (1970). The approach envisages an incremental path towards
e±cient pricing, with revealed and stated preference methods being used to reveal
opportunity costs. Indepen (2004) provides a helpful summary of the assumptions
underlying this approach. In particular, markets are perfect (market structure is-
sues are not discussed) and spectrum allocation (or channel assignment) has already
taken place. These, of course, are potential weaknesses of an optimal pricing regime
that should aim to maximise welfare subject to various constraints (including those
relating to channel interference). In addition, the approach provides little help for
any regulator charged (as we understand Ofcom to be) with the task of encouraging
competition|oligopolistic equilibria must be addressed here.
In this paper we show how to combine the above generalisations in order to derive
an optimal price for spectrum. We incorporate interference constraints (using basic
graph theory) in the allocation of spectrum and show how this can a®ect downstream
1Other areas include the bene¯ts of cooperation between users in mesh networks that may avoid
the tragedy of the commons in the licence-exempt sector, and the e®ects of spectrum trading (see
Jones et al. (2004)).
1retail prices. We also allow for oligopoly. Thus, the regulator in e®ect chooses
both a spectrum licence price and the number of ¯rms in the industry. In this
setting, `optimal AIP' must take account of consumer surplus, the reduction in tax
distortions resulting from licence revenue, productive e±ciency and the e®ect on
market structure. We show that in such a setting, the optimal AIP is is higher in
sectors where spectrum can be shared and that it acts as Ramsey tax across sectors
of the economy, i.e., is inversely related to the elasticity of demand. As a special
case of our model we examine optimal pricing where the regulator is constrained to
ignore the revenue implications. Then optimal spectrum prices are lower and the
relationship between prices and the ability to share spectrum is reversed. Moreover
the Ramsey tax e®ect no longer applies. We show that the Smith/NERA AIP
provides a incremental approach to changing spectrum prices that takes into account
productive e±ciency, but ignores the other e®ects that feature in our optimal pricing,
namely the consumers' willingness to pay, revenue and imperfect competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2, 3 and 4 together
provide a general framework for spectrum pricing that combines the productive
and allocative e±ciency aspects of spectrum allocation and therefore places the
market valuation of (non-auctioned)2 spectrum on a theoretically sound footing.3
We ask how a regulator can allocate spectrum when account is taken of the possible
interference between channels and sites. We show that the mathematical channel
assignment problem (between an exogenous set of demands) can be nested within
a wider economic channel allocation problem that endogenises these demands. The
regulator is assumed to allocate spectrum on the basis of prices charged to users
(i.e. ¯rms). In what follows a licence fee for a given bandwidth of spectrum is a per-
2Auctions provide a mechanism for pricing spectrum when the regulator cannot tell how valuable
spectrum is to operators. In this paper we go back a stage and study the complete information
problem where there is no asymmetric information between the regulator and the ¯rms. This
provides an essential benchmark against which to assess mechanisms for addressing asymmetric
information and it allows us to focus on hitherto neglected spatial aspects of spectrum allocation
3These sections draw upon, and develop, work in Leese et al. (2000).
2period rent paid to use the spectrum in a particular geographical location or over
several locations.4 We show how these prices are determined by interactions between
the economy (consumer demands, ¯rms' production decisions and the regulator's
preferences) and the technical requirements of channel assignment.
Section 5 then applies this framework to network licence pricing for the analyti-
cally tractable case of a linear technology for which spectrum is a pure complement
and cannot be substitutes by capital or labour. We demonstrate the subtle relation-
ship between the interference constraints and the pricing and channel use decisions
of network operators and we derive results on optimal pricing referred to above. Sec-
tion 6 relaxes this assumption and provides an outline of how optimal prices could
be computed given a general production technology. Section 7 provides a compar-
ison between our scheme and the AIP of Smith-NERA. Finally section 8 provides
conclusions and an indication of possible future research.
2 The Channel Assignment Problem
Productive e±cency implies the uses of inputs, including radio spectrum, to mini-
mize the cost of particular goods and services. This aspect involves both the alloca-
tion of spectrum to particular broad use categories (e.g., broadcasting, ¯xed-wireless
applications) and, within each use, the assignment of spectrum rights to particular
users within a particular frequency band. The latter channel assignment problem
involves the mathematical problem of how to assign channels to a competing, but
pre-determined, set of demands while satisfying co-site and inter-site constraints im-
posed by the need to avoid excessive interference so as to either minimize the span
required, or to use the maximum span and minimize some interference cost function
(Leese, 1998).
4Note that we assume linear spectrum prices. A more complicated access structure would be
for the regulator set a non-linear sliding scale of access charges.
We consider licences that apply to both a single market in a particular locality or to a network
of markets over many localities.
3Thus the channel assignment problem deals with the competing wishes to provide
su±cient radio coverage while at the same time avoiding unacceptable interference
between groups of transmitters (see Leese (1998)). The problem speci¯cation must
therefore include information about the requirements for spectrum across the sys-
tem, and also a set of constraints, designed to limit the interference levels, that a
channel assignment should respect. In the version of the problem used most widely
in practice, the spectrum requirements are given by specifying the number of dis-
tinct channels that each transmitter site requires. So, for instance, if there are n
transmitter sites, called T1;T2;:::;Tn, then we have a corresponding set of demands
m1;m2;:::;mn, where site Ti requires the assignment of mi distinct channels.
There are several ways of specifying these constraints. The commonest usual
route, which re°ects the use of protection ratios in the radio community, is to have
a set of constraints each relating to either a single transmitter site (called co-site
constraints), or a pair of transmitter sites (called inter-site constraints). To be
explicit, suppose the channels are labelled by integer values, corresponding to their
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for some speci¯ed minimum channel separation ·i. Likewise, the inter-site con-
straints require that if f(i) and f(j) are channels assigned to two di®erent transmitter




for some speci¯ed minimum channel separation ·ij (equal to ·ji). The constraints
are therefore completely speci¯ed by the numbers ·i and ·ij, which are usually
written in the form of a matrix, called the constraint matrix. The ·i make up the
diagonal entries and the ·ij the o®-diagonal entries.
The ¯nal part of the problem speci¯cation is the objective, for which there are
two natural choices. The ¯rst and most widely studied to date is the minimum
4span problem, in which the aim is to ¯nd an assignment satisfying all spectrum
requirements and all interference constraints, for which the span, de¯ned as the
di®erence between the highest and lowest channels used, is as small as possible.
This would tend to be the concern of spectrum regulators and system designers. The
second possibility, which we adopt in this paper, is the ¯xed spectrum problem, in
which a maximum span is given (corresponding to the amount of spectrum available)
and the aim is to assign channels to as many spectrum requirements as possible,
within the given span and without violating any constraints. This would tend to
be the concern of system operators, as they attempt to manage existing services.
A variant on the ¯xed spectrum problem would assign channels to all spectrum
requirements and try to minimize the number of violated constraints.
The above speci¯cation assumes that the transmitter locations and powers are
¯xed (they are e®ectively taken account of by the constraint matrix). More general
formulations could have locations and powers as extra variables, to be optimized
along with the channels, but there has been very little theoretical work on such
problems to date.
The channel assignment problem has exercised many researchers over many
years. The standard formulation includes, as a special case, the celebrated graph-
colouring problem. A graph in this context is a collection of abstract `nodes', some
pairs of which are joined by `edges'. The colouring problem is to attach a colour to
each node in such a way that a pair of joined nodes should receive di®erent colours
and the total number of colours used should be as small as possible. The smallest
number of colours needed is called the chromatic number of the graph. If we think
of the nodes as transmitter sites and the colours as channels then we have precisely
a minimum span channel assignment problem, in which all the mi are 1, and the ·ij
are 1 if the nodes Ti and Tj are joined and 0 otherwise. (Since only one channel is
required at each site, the values given to the co-site constraints ·i are immaterial.)
In physical terms, we are modelling only co-channel interference, with the edges in
the graph indicating the rough location of potential coverage blackspots.
5We now relate this very general formulation of the channel assignment and graph
colouring problems to an economic model that explains demands for channels in
terms of cost and market conditions. Each `transmitter site' or node in the graph
incorporates a local market consisting of an oligopoly of ¯rms producing a service
which we assume to be homogeneous. A spatial interpretation of nodes or sites is to
regard them as equal cells (e.g. squares) comprising the region under consideration.
A `transmitter site' then consists of all the transmitters used by the ¯rm, and it is
possible that ¯rms can share transmitters, perhaps charging an access price. We
propose this as our `core' economic model.
Each member of the oligopoly requires radio channels to provide the service. In
each cell a local oligopoly provides a local service. Each ¯rm within this market
purchases a licence from the regulator to use a number of channels which depends
on the volume of service. The proximity of ¯rms implies that no channel re-use is
possible within a cell and we assume that there is only co-channel interference (i.e.
·i = 1;·ij = 0 or 1). The demands for radio channels in each market is the sum
of individual demands of the ¯rms in that market. We model these demands in the
next section.
Each cell can now be given a colour and a shared colour indicates the possibility
of `channel re-use' or `sharing' between these regions. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this
description of the channel assignment problem using a 4-node graph. The chromatic
number of the graph in Figure 1. Figure 2 is the coloured map using two colours.
Numbers inside circles are market demands and in our example demand increases
as we proceed from West to East. Because diagonal squares can share channels the
total demand of 60 channels can be serviced by a minimum of 40 distinct channels:
say, 1-10 in market A, 11-30 in market B of which 11-20 can be re-used in market
C. In market D 1-10 can be re-used from market A leaving a further distinct group
of channels, say 31-40, to complete the radio channel requirements of these four
markets, given the constraint matrix.
63 The Core Economic Model
We now turn to details of the core economic model. We consider a single local market
with N competing ¯rms providing a homogeneous service at a market price P.5 Firm
k produces output qk, k = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;N and output Q =
PN
k=1 qk. The demand curve
is given by Q = D(P); D0(P) < 0 and we assume that limP!1 PD(P) = 0. In
what follows we write the inverse demand curve as P = D¡1(Q) = P(Q) for short.
Units of output are customer-minutes of some service requiring radio channels as an
input per unit of time (say, the ¯nancial year).
Dropping the ¯rm subscript for now, on the supply side labour (L), capital (K)
and radio spectrum (Z) combine as inputs to produce output given a production.
Let us ¯rst consider the following very general CES production function which we
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where T is a total factor productivity, a measure of technical e±ciency. In (1) we
have grouped capital and spectrum together with an elasticity of substitution equal
to 1
1¡». The elasticity of substitution between labour and the grouped inputs Z and
K is 1
1¡´. Then if spectrum and capital are substitutes, but labour is a complement
to the other inputs we would choose » 2 (0;1) and ´ < 0.
Alternatively we could model spectrum as a complement to the other two sub-
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Given a production function in one of these forms and given factor prices (w;r;a)
per unit of labour, capital and spectrum respectively, we can formulate a minimum
5Later we introduce sectors and in each sector we allow ¯rms to provide the service across a
number of local markets.
7cost function per unit of output c(w;r;a) in the standard way. Associated factor de-




@a < 0. We assume that each ¯rm is a price taker in factor markets
and in the market for licences which incorporates all local markets such as the one
modelled in this section. We assume that the price elasticity of demand in the mar-
ket, ²(Q) = ¡
PdQ
QdP, is constant with respect to total output Q. We assume that ² > 1
for reasons which will become apparent.
The sequence of actions is as follows:
1. The regulator sets the licence price for spectrum
2. Firms compete in the market given the licence prices and other factor prices.
The appropriate equilibrium concept is a subgame perfect equilibrium found by
backward induction. We assume a Cournot-Nash equilibrium at stage 2 of the
game. Thus in setting the licence price at stage 1 the regulator acts as a Stackelberg
Leader. The next two sub-sections solve for stage 2 of the game, considering in
turn the cases of an exogenous number of ¯rms and then an endogenous number
determined by a free entry zero-pro¯t condition.
3.1 A Symmetric Equilibrium with an Exogenous Number
of Firms
. Given the core model, pro¯ts for the kth ¯rm are
¦k = ¦k(qk;w;r;a) = [P ¡ ck(w;r;a)]qk ¡ F (3)
The ¯rm's problem is to choose qk to maximize ¦k.
Write total output Q = qk + ~ qk. In a market-clearing equilibrium this is equated
with total demand D(P). Then in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium ¯rm k takes the
output of all other ¯rms, ~ qk, as given along with the inverse demand curve P =
D¡1(Q) = D¡1(qk + ~ qk) and the access price. Note that ¯rms then act strategically
with respect to other ¯rms' choices of output. However at stage 2 of the game, as
8followers in a leader-follower game they are price-takers with respect to the access
price a. This rules out strategic bidding for licences which the auction literature
considers.
Firm k maximizes pro¯ts given by (3) with respect to qk given ~ qk, a and the
market-clearing condition P = D¡1(Q) = D¡1(qk + ~ qk) where we recall that P =
D¡1(Q) is the inverse demand curve. The ¯rst-order condition for pro¯t-maximization
is then
P
0qk + P ¡ ck(w;r;a) = 0 (4)
and the second-order condition is
2P
0 + qkP
00 < 0 (5)







where ² = ²(Q) = ¡
PdQ
QdP is the elasticity of demand. As the number of ¯rms
increases the price tends to the marginal cost (including the marginal cost of the
channel), ck(w;r;a). Since we assume that ¯rms are identical, Q = Nqk = Nq,






say. Note that since factor prices w;r are exogenous in the model (determined by
the general equilibrium in which the market model is embedded) we omit them as
arguments in the price function (7). ²N > ² > 1 ensures the price is always positive
and is also a second-order condition for pro¯t-maximization. To see this write a
constant elasticity demand curve as
Q = AP
¡² (8)
Di®erentiating twice with respect to Q we have
P
00 =
(² + 1)(P 0)2
P
(9)
9Substitute for P 00 in (5) and also put qk = q = Q=N. Then using P 0 < 0 and
² = ¡
P dQ





Since 2N ¡ 1 · 1 for N ¸ 1, clearly ² > 1 is su±cient for (10) to be satis¯ed.
The intuition behind this condition is that if the elasticity of demand is too low,
then ¯rms can allow the market price and pro¯ts to increase inde¯nitely by reducing
output.
In an N-identical ¯rm Cournot-Nash equilibrium output of each ¯rm is given by
q = Q=N = D(P(a;N))=N with corresponding pro¯ts:
¦ = ¦(a;N) = [P(a;n) ¡ c(w;r;a)]D(P(a;N))=N ¡ F (11)
This leads to our ¯rst proposition:
Proposition 1
Assume ² > 1. Then pro¯ts ¦(a;N) decreases with respect to a and N.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows. An increase in the licence
price increases cost and with that the retail price. Demand falls and if the elasticity
of demand is greater than unity, revenue falls resulting in an decrease in pro¯ts. An
increase in the number of ¯rms reduces the mark-up and has two opposing e®ects
on pro¯ts: the price falls increasing total revenue; but this revenue is now shared
between more ¯rms. With a constant elasticity of demand ² > 1 the latter dominates
and pro¯ts per ¯rm fall.
3.2 A Free Entry Symmetric Equilibrium
Up to now we have taken the number of ¯rms N as exogenous. There are two
ways of making N endogenous. The ¯rst, is to make N a policy variable, chosen by
the regulator when she issues the channel licences. The second, considered in this
10subsection, is to assume that there are no barriers to entry except a participation
constraint that pro¯ts cannot be negative. Firms will then enter up to the point at
which pro¯ts become negative.
The number of ¯rms in equilibrium is given by N¤ which, given the licence price,
satis¯es6
¦(a;N
¤) = 0 (12)
Since from Proposition 1, ¦(a;N) is decreasing in N and becomes negative for large
N, if we assume that a monopolist would enjoy positive pro¯ts (ie ¦(a;1) > 0), then
there exists a unique N¤(a) satisfying (12). Furthermore di®erentiating (12) with









From Proposition 1, ¦(0;1) > ¦(a;1) > 0. Also from limP!1 PD(P) = 0,
¦(a;1) becomes negative for su±ciently large a. Hence even for a monopolist there
exists an access price that would force pro¯ts below zero and drive the ¯rm out of
business.

















da < 0 and dZ
da < 0 we arrive at
dm(a)
da < 0. We can now gather our results
together as:
Proposition 2
(1) Given the access price a, and the total demand D(P) there exists an
unique number of ¯rms N¤(a) providing this service.
(2) N¤(a) decreases with a.
6Note that free entry will lead to suboptimal duplication of ¯xed costs. See Perry (1984).
11(3) There exists a su±ciently high access price that drives all ¯rms out
of business.
(4) Total demand for channels m¤(a) decreases with a.
The ¯nal result here is the crucial one. Demand falls as access prices increase
through two e®ects. First for a given number of ¯rms, the price increases as ¯rms
raise prices with rising costs. Second, higher access prices force some ¯rms out of
business leaving the remaining ones with more market power. They then use this
greater market power to raise their mark-up over the higher costs.
4 Optimal Spectrum Pricing
Now consider p sectors of the economy using radio spectrum and providing a ho-
mogeneous service. We assume services across sectors are neither substitutes nor
complements. In each sector i = 1;2;¢¢¢;p there are `i local markets such as the one
considered previously in the core model. Assume that there is no substitution by
consumers between products provided in each sector. The assignment of spectrum
is subject to interference constraints discussed in Section 3.1. Each local market
requires a number of transmitters which are too close to share radio channels. We
can treat these transmitters as one node in our previous discussion so a node rep-
resents both a market and a cluster of transmitters which can be considered as one
transmitter on one site. The spectrum allocation problem can now be embedded in
the following wider economic allocation problem:
1. Calculate the total demand for radio channels in each local market j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢; `i
for each sector i = 1;2;¢¢¢;p. Because there is no substitutability nor comple-
mentarity across sectors, assuming the same across markets demand in local
market j of sector i will depend only the price Pij evaluated according to the
previous section.
























In (16), 1 + ¤ is the cost of public funds where ¤ > 0 captures the distor-
tionary e®ects of taxes that would otherwise be required in the absence of
this revenue. Another interpretation of (16) is as a regulator's objective func-
tion that incorporates obligations imposed by law. Under UK and EU law
pricing of spectrum must be limited to spectrum management considerations
and must not be used as an instrument for raising taxes. This suggests that
regulators must ignore the revenue term in (16) and therefore choose ¤ = ¡1.
In what follows we retain a general socialnobjective function of the form (16)
and substitute ¤ > 0 or ¤ = ¡1 after the optimization exercise.
3. The social planner can now maximize (16) with respect to access prices aij;i =
1;:::;p; j = 1;:::;`i and the numbers of ¯rms providing each service in each
market, Nj; j = 1;p, subject to the engineering constraints discussed in Sec-







Licences are provided for a limited number of ¯rms. In general pro¯ts will
therefore not be driven down to zero by the process of free entry, and total
pro¯ts must be included in the social welfare of a utilitarian regulator.
134. If the spectrum regulator is not responsible for market structure she would
maximize (16) with respect to spectrum prices only subject to a free-entry
equilibrium condition
¦ij(aij;Nij) = 0; i = 1;¢ ¢ ¢;p; j = 1;¢ ¢ ¢;`i (20)
and the engineering constraints and total spectrum constraint.
5. In principle the welfare maximizing regulator should choose di®erent spectrum
prices in each market to re°ect di®erent demand and cost conditions and the
nature of the inter-market interference constraints. However practical concerns
may dictate that the same spectrum price is administered in a sector (i.e.,
aij = ai). Indeed, if channel trading between markets is allowed, arbitrage
would constrain the regulator in this way.
6. In this very general set-up the number of ¯rms varies across markets in each
sector. We can think of these ¯rms as local operators, each ¯rm providing a
service in a single market. An alternative is to consider each ¯rm as a network
operators providing a homogeneous service across all markets in the sector.
Then in sector i and market j we have that Nij = Ni. This assumption is
adopted in the example that follows.
5 Optimal Spectrum Pricing with Linear Tech-
nology
To illustrate this framework we examine the optimal network licence price across
sectors consisting of Ni network operators providing a service across `i local markets.
Firms and markets are identical except for the interference constraints. Firms have
access to a band of radio channels which can be used in all `i markets, interference
constraints permitting. For each channel they pay a ¯xed licence price ai payable to
the regulator per unit of time. No channel sharing is possible within a local market.
14First consider the case of `i = 3 in a particular sector i. There are now four
interference graphs to consider. The two most straightforward are two homogeneous
cases: a complete graph which has edges between every pair of nodes and the other
extreme of a graph with no edges. Less straightforward and more interesting are
the inhomogeneous cases of a single edge graph and graph with two edges shown in
Figure 3.
We ¯rst focus on the pricing and output decisions of network operators given the
licence price in a particular sector. Until we come to examine sector-speci¯c prices
in subsection 5.4 below we drop the sector subscript i. To simplify the analysis in
the following subsections, we modify the core economic model by specializing the
production function to:
q = [°1L
´ + (1 ¡ °1)K
´]
1
´ ; z ¸ q (21)
Thus we consider a linear technology for spectrum for which spectrum is a pure
complement and cannot be substituted by capital or labour; output q is produced
using a Leontief technology. Without loss of generality we can choose units such that
one unit of `output' requires one radio channel and output capacity equals the total
number of channels available. Thus for ¯rm k to produce output qkj per period in a
particular local market j = 1;2;3, it requires Zk ¸ zkj ¸ qkj radio channel licences
where Zk is the total spectrum held and zkj are the channels available to ¯rm k in
market j. These will depend on the nature of the interference graph. We assume
that the licence fee a is independent of the ¯rm and its location. Total costs include
a set-up cost F so total costs for ¯rm k are given by




where c = c(w;r) is the cost function associated with the CES production function
of labour and capital in (21).
As set out above, the sequencing of events is that the regulator ¯rst sets the
licence price for spectrum in a particular sector i and second, ¯rms compete in the
15market given the licence price a and other factor prices. Proceeding by backward
induction, given factor prices (w;r) ¯rm k chooses labour and capital to minimize
the cost c(w;r)qkj of producing output qkj in market j = 1;2;3. By choice of units
and Leontief production this requires qkj radio channels in market j. Prices in each
market are Pj to re°ect the radio environment. The ¯rm purchases a licence for Zk
radio channels at a price a. Taking the relevant interference graph into consideration,
this permits the ¯rm to use zkj · Zk channels in market j. In a Cournot-Nash





(Pj ¡ c)qkj ¡ aZk ¡ F (23)
given the channel availability constraint
qkj · zkj · Zk (24)
and given the output of other ¯rms ~ qkj in markets j = 1;2;3.
5.1 Homogeneous Graphs
These are the most straightforward cases. For the graph with no edges, all channels
are available in each market and therefore zkj = Zk. Let ¸j ¸ 0 be the shadow price
associated with the constraint (24). Then ¯rm k maximizes a Lagrangian
Lk = ¦k ¡
3 X
j=1
¸j(qkj ¡ Zk) (25)
with respect to qkj, Zk, f¸kg given the corresponding decisions of other ¯rms. The
¯rst order condition are for j = 1;2;3
qkj : (Pj ¡ c) + qjP
0
j ¡ ¸j = 0 (26)
Zk : ¡a +
3 X
j
¸j = 0 (27)
CS : ¸j(qkj ¡ Zk) = 0 (28)
16Equation (26) equates the marginal return from providing output in each market
with the shadow price of spectrum in that market. Equation (27) equates the price of
spectrum with the network shadow price. (42) are the Kuhn-Tucker complementary
slackness conditions. If a constraint does not bind the corresponding shadow price
takes a zero value.
The solution for this homogeneous case is very simple. By symmetry ¸j =
¸ = a
3 > 0 and the constraints bind. Proceeding as before in a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, the Lerner price in all markets is given by










per market. Then either a free-entry condition ¦(a;N) = 0 or a regulator's choice
of the number of ¯rms to be allowed licences determines N.
The other homogeneous case where all nodes are joined is very similar. Now
given Zk, zkj =
Zk
3 channels are available per market. By a similar analysis we then
arrive at the price in each market given by





E®ectively ¯rms are now paying more for their spectrum because they cannot share
the costs across markets, so from Proposition 1 pro¯ts in this case are lower and
less ¯rms will enter this market in free entry equilibrium.
5.2 A Graph with Two Edges
In Figure 6 let markets j = 1;2;3 be at nodes A, B and C. Then for ¯rm k if all Zk
channels are available in market 1 and qk1 · Zk are used, then zk2 = zk3 = Zk ¡qk1
are available in markets 2 and 3. Then ¯rm k maximizes a Lagrangian
Lk = ¦k ¡ ¸1(qk1 ¡ Zk) ¡ ¸2(qk2 ¡ Zk + qk1) ¡ ¸3(qk3 ¡ Zk + qk1) (31)
17with respect to qkj, Zk, ¸k given the corresponding decisions of other ¯rms. The
¯rst order condition are





¸j = 0 (32)
qk2 : (P2 ¡ c) + q2P
0
2 ¡ ¸2 = 0 (33)
qk3 : (P3 ¡ c) + q3P
0
3 ¡ ¸3 = 0 (34)
Zk : ¡a +
3 X
j
¸j = 0 (35)
CS : ¸kj(qkj ¡ zkj) = 0 (36)
The solution to these conditions sees market 1 releasing spectrum for the other two
markets k so ¸1 = 0. Spectrum is fully utilized in markets 2 and 3 so ¸2;¸3 > 0.
In symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria, following the same reasoning as before we












Thus we can see that prices are lower in markets where spectrum can be shared.
In a sector characterized by two-edged graphs prices will be lower in some markets
than in sectors with complete graphs but pro¯ts will be higher (again by appeal to
Proposition 1). It follows that in the less congested sector (in the radio interference
sense) higher pro¯ts will encourage more entry and markets will be more competitive.
5.3 A Graph with One Edge
In market 1 (node A) all channels are available so zk1 = Zk. In markets 2 and 3
channels can be shared and zk2 = zk3 = Z
2. Now ¯rm k maximizes a Lagrangian
Lk = ¦k ¡ ¸1(qk1 ¡ Zk) ¡ ¸2(qk2 ¡
Zk
2




18with respect to qkj, Zk, ¸k given the corresponding decisions of other ¯rms. The
¯rst order condition are for j = 1;2;3
qkj : (Pj ¡ c) + qjP
0
j ¡ ¸j = 0 (40)
Zk : ¡a + ¸1 +
1
2
(¸2 + ¸3) = 0 (41)
CS : ¸kj(qkj ¡ zkj) = 0 (42)
We ¯rst solve for a Type I equilibrium where all constraints bind (¸j > 0, j=1,2,3).







P2 = P3 =




D(P1) = 2D(P2) where D(P) = AP
¡² (45)
¸2 = ¸3 = a ¡ ¸1 (46)




















c(1 ¡ 2²) + a
1 + 2² (49)
¸2 = ¸3 =
(2² ¡ 1)(a + c)
(1 + 2²)
(50)
It follows from this solution that ¸2 = ¸3 > 0 if ² > 1 which we have already
imposed, but that ¸1 > 0 imposes a condition on the licence price
a > c(2
² ¡ 1) (51)
If (51) does not hold then we must have a Type II equilibrium where the capacity
constraint in market 1 does not bind and there is are spare radio channels. Then











¸2 = ¸3 = a (54)
These results for a single edge graph in particular highlight the subtle relationship
between the interference constraints and the pricing and channel use decisions of
network operators. I® the regulator sets a su±ciently high licence price such that
(51) holds all channels will be fully utilized in each market. The drawback is that
prices will be higher directly through the e®ect of the licence price on the retail
Lerner index and indirectly through higher concentration in a free-entry equilibrium.
The mathematical framework developed for analyzing these examples can be
used to develop software capable of handling much larger problems. However the
small node-number examples considered here are su±cient to demonstrate that the
spatially distributed aspects of channel assignment problems provide new challenges
for analysis that go beyond standard economic treatments.
5.4 The Optimal Licence Price
We now turn to the regulator's choice of an optimal licence price for a particular
sector i (recall we have suppressed the sector i subscript in the preceding analysis).
We consider a free entry equilibrium where ¯rms enter until pro¯ts are driven down
to zero. For analytical convenience, we con¯ne ourselves to homogeneous graphs,
but unlike the previous section we now generalize the analysis to any number of
local markets `i in sector i. Furthermore as in the previous section we continue to
consider network operators providing a homogeneous service across `i local markets
in sector i, but with homogeneous graphs the regulator's problem is identical if
we assume local operators.7 Ni network operators or ¯rms are identical in each
7Let aL be the licence price for local operators. Putting a = `aL we then arrive at an identical
optimization problem described below.
20sector i and demand Zi radio channels at a licence price ai to now be determined.
The revenue in sector i is therefore NiZiai and since graphs are homogeneous, retail
prices and identical in a particular sector across local markets; i.e., Pij = Pi. Putting
Sij = Si =
R 1
Pi Di(P)dP the regulator's problem set out in general form in section 3
now becomes one to maximize with respect to a = (a1;a2;¢ ¢ ¢;ap) the social welfare
function















and the interference constraints implied by the graphs.
Con¯ning ourselves to homogeneous graphs, there are two types of sectors to
consider. Those with graphs consisting of `i nodes all connected to each other are
referred to as sectors without spectrum re-use. Then the demand for spectrum is
NiZi = `iDi(Pi) and from the previous sub-section the retail price set by the ¯rm is




. Graphs consisting of ` nodes without any edges are referred to
as sectors with spectrum re-use. Then the demand for spectrum is NiZi = Di(Pi) and







De¯ne ki = 1 for sectors without spectrum re-use and ki = 1
`i for sectors with
spectrum re-use. Then (55) can be written as





















and the interference constraints. Within sectors these are that channels cannot be
shared between ¯rms in a local market but within the ¯rm, as a network operator,
21it can share between markets in sectors with spectrum re-use (ki = 1
`i), but not in
sectors without spectrum re-use (ki = 1). Within sectors the regulator then assigns
di®erent channels to each ¯rm and imposes constraints across markets if appropriate
(though ¯rms, not wanting to cause interference between their own sites, might self-
impose such constraints). Given the licence price ¯rms then compete making entry
(or exit) decisions and resulting in a retail price in each sector given by (58). Between
sectors we assume that harmonisation agreements prevent the possibilities of sharing
spectrum.
To carry out the regulator's optimization problem de¯ne a Lagrangian





where ¹ is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the spectrum resource constraint
(i.e., the shadow price of spectrum). Writing (58) Pi = Pi(ai;Ni(ai)) as in 3.2.1, the
















The left-hand-side of (61) is the marginal bene¯t from a marginal increase in the
spectrum price from increased revenue (the second term) minus the marginal cost
from a drop in consumer surplus (the ¯rst term). The right-hand-side is the marginal
cost of spectrum evaluated at its shadow price ¹.8
To proceed with the analysis we need to evaluate
dPi




i ¡ Fi = 0 (using (A.1) from the appendix). Di®erentiating












The ¯rst term on the right-hand-side of (62) is the direct e®ect of an increase in the
licence price on the retail price. The second term is an indirect e®ect arising from
8Notice that the expression for the optimal licence price in each sector depends only on demand
and supply conditions in that sector and the shadow price of spectrum, not on conditions in other
sectors. The reason for this convenient decomposition is the assumed absence of any substitutability
or complementarity of services between sectors.
22the exit of ¯rms as the cost spectrum rises. Di®erentiating the free-entry condition




(²i ¡ 1)(²iNi ¡ 1)












where we have de¯ned
½i = ½i(²i;Ni) =
2(²iNi ¡ 1)
(2²iNi ¡ 1 ¡ ²i)
(65)
Note that as Ni ! 1 and markets become competitive, ½i ! 1. Given Ni, as ²i







Dividing (61) by Di(Pi) and using ²i = ¡
PidDi
DidPi and (64) we can, after some




























¡ Fi = 0 (67)





max) = 0 (68)
and the retail price equation (58) gives four equations for Ni, ai, Pi and ¹ at the
optimum, given parameters ²i, ci, ki, ¤ and Ai. This completes the solution for the
optimal licence price.
From (66) an important result linking the optimal licence price to the extent of
congestion captured by our parameter ki is apparent. Given the number of ¯rms Ni
(66) says that the optimal price falls as congestion increases and the ai(Ni) shifts
23downwards Furthermore since from (58), congestion e®ectively increases the spec-
trum price per unit of output, so the downward-sloping free-entry relationship Ni(a)
shifts to the left. These two e®ects are illustrated in ¯gure 4. We summarize this
result as:
Proposition 3.
Assuming linear technology for spectrum and homogeneous graphs, ce-
teris paribus the optimal licence price in sectors without spectrum re-use
is lower than that in sectors with spectrum re-use.
The result that the inability to re-use spectrum is not accompanied by a `conges-
tion tax' consisting of a higher spectrum licence price may seem counter-intuitive.
The reason why a higher licence price is not necessary to reduce demand for spectrum
in sectors without spectrum re-use is that network operators perform this function
by raising the retail price. This is illustrated in ¯gures 5 and 6 for the cases where
spectrum is scarce (¹ > 0) and where it is not (¹ = 0) respectively.9 If spectrum is
scarce the retail price rises as ki rises from ki = 1
`i for homogeneous graphs without
edges (where spectrum can be shared across local markets) to ki = 1 for homoge-
neous graphs with every node connected where no channel sharing is possible. For
example if `i = 5 we need to compare ki = 1
5 and ki = 1 for cases of sectors with
spectrum re-use and without spectrum re-use respectively. As we move from these
two cases, if ¹ > 0 and spectrum is scarce then in our illustrative example the retail
price more than doubles, the number of ¯rms drops from 5 to 3. The regulator
who is equally concerned for the welfare of consumers in sectors with and without
spectrum re-use, cushions the e®ect of the latter by lowering and not raising the
licence price in that sector relative to the sector where spectrum re-use is possible
(a drop from around 2.5 to 2.2 in our example). If spectrum is plentiful (¹ = 0) we
can see from (66) that aiki and therefore from (58) the retail price is independent
of the parameter ki. It follows from the free-entry condition that this must also be
true of Ni and therefore ai is simply proportional to 1
ki, as in apparent in ¯gure 6.
9Baseline parameter values are ci = Ai = 1, ¤ = 0:3, ²i = 2 and `i = 3. Fixed entry costs Fi are
chosen so that at baseline parameter values in sectors without spectrum re-use (ki = 3), Ni = 4.
24A number of simpler expression for special cases provide useful insights. First





(1 + ¤)²i ¡ ¤
(69)
From this result it follows that for ¤ > 0,
dai
d²i < 0 a result that is con¯rmed numer-
ically in ¯gure 7 for any Ni. The result that the licence price is inversely related to
the elasticity of demand is a familiar property of a Ramsey price from the regula-
tion literature that applies to optimal spectrum licence pricing as long a taxes are
distortionary (¤ > 0). To summarize:
Proposition 4.
For large Ni the inverse elasticities rule of Ramsey prices and taxes apply:
the optimal license price in a sector is inversely related to the elasticity
of demand. Numerical results suggest this may hold for small Ni.
Finally if in addition to Ni being large, ¤ = 0 and there are no distortionary
e®ects from taxation, then ai = ¹ and the optimal licence price is simply equal to the
shadow price of spectrum and independent of all the characteristics that distinguish
the sectors.
Up to this point we have reported results for the case where the regulator maxi-
mizes a social welfare function with ¤ > 0 that (correctly) assumes there are welfare
bene¯ts from the revenue from licence fees. We now assume that the regulator is
constrained by law to ignore these bene¯ts. Our general framework handles this
case if we put ¤ = ¡1. The competitive case where Ni is large is straightforward to
analyze. Then (69) becomes




It is now apparent that the relationship between the optimal licence price under this
constraint and both the spectrum re-use parameter ki and the elasticity of demand
²i is now the opposite of that reported in propositions 3 and 4. In other words these
results depend critically on revenue generation considerations. Thus we have the
proposition:
Proposition 5
25If the regulator adopts an objective function that ignores the welfare
bene¯ts of revenue from licence fees the the constrained optimal licence
price in sectors without spectrum re-use is now greater. For large Ni,
the constrained optimal licence price in sectors with spectrum re-use is
positively related to the elasticity of demand.
Figure 8 for ¤ = ¡1 demonstrates the ¯rst part of this result and corresponds
to ¯gure 4 for ¤ = 0:3. Figure 9 for ¤ = ¡1 that the relationship between he
constrained optimal licence and the elasticity of demand becomes ambiguous for the
oligopoly case.
5.5 The Incorporation of Costs of Adjusting Licence Prices
A feature of the administered incentive pricing (AIP) scheme discussed and com-
pared with our optimal pricing scheme in a later section is that it is incremental,
gradually adjusting towards a more e±cient allocation of the spectrum. This feature
can be introduced into optimal pricing by incorporating adjustment costs of chang-
ing the licence price. The optimization problem now is no longer static. Let a¤ be
the vector of optimal prices that solves the static problem set out in the previous











2 + ©(ai(t) ¡ ai(t ¡ 1))
2] (71)
where ¯ 2 (0;1] is a discount factor. This welfare loss expresses the idea that the
regulator would prefer to be at the static optimal set of prices but is subjected to
costs of change prices proportion to (¢a(t))2 where ¢ai(t) = ai(t) ¡ ai(t ¡ 1) is
the change in the licence price over the interval [t ¡ 1;t] in sector i. As the cost of
adjustment parameter © ! 0 we approach the previous problem where the regulator
instantaneously jumps to the static optimum a = a¤.
At time t = 1, the regulator now minimizes ­ with respect to a given historical
prices a(0). The ¯rst-order condition for a minimum in sector i is given by
¡(a
¤
i ¡ ai(t)) + ©(ai(t) ¡ ai(t ¡ 1) ¡ ©¯(ai(t + 1) ¡ ai(t)) = 0 (72)
26Let ^ ai(t) = ai(t)¡a¤
i be the deviation of the licence price about the static optimum.
Then the ¯rst-order condition can be written as
¯©^ ai(t + 1) ¡ (1 + ©(1 + ¯))^ ai(t) + ©^ ai(t ¡ 1) = 0 (73)
To solve this second-order di®erence equation take z-transforms to give the char-
acteristic equation
¯©z
2 ¡ (1 + ©(1 + ¯))z + © = 0 (74)
It is straightforward to show that this has two positive roots z1 < 1 and z2 > 1. The
system is therefore saddle-path stable with solution
^ ai(t) = z
t
1^ ai(0) (75)
Figure 10 illustrates this adjustment process with costs of adjustment by plotting
the solution (75) for a low cost, medium cost and high cost cases. For the sector in
question the optimal static spectrum price as assumed to be unity and the initial
price is zero. As one would expect as costs of adjustment are lowered, the speed
of adjustment to the static optimum increases. More generally this section shows
how a rational regulator facing adjustment costs would act in an incremental fashion
moving quickly or slowly toward the static optimum, depending on the size of the
costs of adjustment, so mimicking the adjustment process advocated by AIP.
6 Optimal Pricing with General Technology
In the previous subsection for reasons of tractability we con¯ned ourselves to linear
technology where there was no scope for substituting spectrum for other factors of
production. Now we sketch out how optimal pricing may be formulated for more
general production technologies which do allow for alternative spectrum saving ways
of producing services such as those expressed by production functions (1) or (2). The
total costs of producing qi output in sector i with spectrum costing ai now becomes
Ci(qi;ai) = Fi + ci(wi;ri;kiai)qi (76)
27where ci(wi;ri;kiai) is the cost per unit of output and kiai is the e®ective cost of
spectrum for network operators. By Shephard's Lemma we have that the demand











We can now generalize the regulator's problem expressed by (57) to (59) for
linear technology to the maximization with respect to a of




















and the interference constraints.
To implement this procedure we require either a production function for the
service using spectrum is required or the cost function (76). Empirically the latter
is usually the preferred method of estimating factor demands using, for example,
translog functional forms. Unlike the previous case of linear technology the ¯rst
order conditions are not analytically tractable and would require numerical solution
using an estimated or calibrated production or cost function.10
7 AIP versus Optimal Prices
We are now in a position to compare the `Administered Incentive Prices' (AIP)
proposed by Smith-NERA (1996) with optimal prices. To examine the latter assume
10Even for the simplest non-linear technology, a Cobb-Douglas production function, the ¯rst-
order condition corresponding to (66) is a high-order polynomial in the licence price ai.
28there are 2 sectors (p = 2) with cost functions per unit of output (in value terms)
for the representative ¯rm:
ci(w;r;a) = wLi(w;r;a) + rKi(w;r;a) + aZi(w;r;a); i = 1;2 (81)
If ¯rms are unconstrained in the choice of inputs then ci(w;r;a) are the minimum
costs chosen by the ¯rms given factor prices (w;r;a). Suppose however that the
licence price is too low to clear the market so at least one of the ¯rms is short of the
spectrum it needs to achieve this minimum cost. Suppose ¯rm 1 is short of spectrum
but ¯rm 2 is unconstrained. Consider a small incremental increase in spectrum for
¯rm 1, ¢Z1 which it substitutes for ¢L1 of labour and ¢K1 of capital. i.e., the
change in cost is
¢c1 = ¡w¢L1 ¡ r¢K1 + a¢Z1 < 0 (82)
whereas for the unconstrained ¯rm 2 the change in cost is
¢c2 = w¢L2 + r¢K2 ¡ a¢Z1 > 0 (83)
since ¢Z2 = ¡¢Z1 and ¯rm 2 has minimized costs before the reallocation. j ¢c1 j is
the Smith-NERA `opportunity cost' or what society forgoes by allocating spectrum
to sector 2 rather than sector 1.
According to the Smith-NERA methodology, licence prices are based on available
estimates of the costs of alternative uses of the radio spectrum. Initial valuations
and the subsequent modi¯cations take qualitative factors a®ecting spectrum use into
account. With relevant data largely unavailable for estimating marginal pro¯t val-
ues, the Smith-NERA (1996) study turned to an approach based marginal values of
the costs of alternatives. One of the more straight forward cases is that of terrestrial
¯xed links. For this sector the a number of methods of relieving excess demand
for spectrum in ¯xed links bands including: installing narrowband equipment, mov-
ing to higher frequencies, moving to cable and releasing spectrum from other uses
sharing the same bands.
For terrestrial ¯xed links, using the spectrum valuation model, Smith-NERA
used the following three-step procedure :
291. Establish what or who is the next best use/user of the spectrum: In lower
bands (e.g. below 2GHz) this might be mobile radio. In higher bands this
might be other ¯xed link users, satellite links etc.
2. Determine what can the next best use/user do if access to spectrum is denied
(a) Mobile: The options include move to di®erent frequency band, use nar-
rowband equipment, implement more cells, change to di®erent operator.
(b) Fixed Link: If all access to spectrum is denied then ¯xed link users
will be forced to move to cable. Otherwise, users can install narrowband
equipment or, where this is not feasible, move to a di®erent frequency
band.
(c) Satellite Earth Station: Move to a di®erent geographical area and
possibly a di®erent country.
3. Take the minimum of these costs. Then the change in costs is our equation
(83).
This description of the theory and practice of AIP has two fundamental features:
¯rst it is incremental based on observations of ine±cient allocations. Second it is
solely concerned with the input side of e±ciency and ignores the consumer willing-
ness to pay and the bene¯ts of reducing distortionary taxes by other means. An
alternative suggested by our analysis is to use consumer surplus plus tax revenue
calculated using the shadow price of taxation forgone in sector 1 by allocating a unit
of spectrum to sector 2. Even if the revenue e®ects are ignored by putting ¤ = ¡1,
the forgone bene¯t in terms of the consumer surplus will depend not only on the







which depends on cost, the elasticity of demand ²1 and market structure through
the e®ect on N1. Writing the consumer surplus in sector 1 as S(P1) we have that
30S0(P1) = ¡D(P1). Thus the e®ect of a lowering of costs by ¢c1 and an increase in







































Since ¢c1 < 0 and ¢N1 > 0 both the cost e®ect and the market structure e®ect on
the consumer surplus based notion of opportunity cost are positive. Note that (85)
corresponds to the objective function used to compute constrained optimal licence
prices by putting ¤ = ¡1 in (16).
Comparing the Smith-NERA AIP given earlier with (85) as criteria for making
incremental changes to licence prices it is now apparent that of the three e®ects
present in the latter { demand, cost and market structure { only the cost e®ect
is taken into account by AIP.11 Thus we have developed a natural extension of
the Smith-NERA methodology that also takes into account imperfect competition,
the revenue e®ect (if so desired by the regulator), the willingness of consumers to
pay, the ability to substitute other factors of production for spectrum and costs of
changing spectrum prices.
8 Conclusions and Future Research
The objective of this paper has been to explore whether valuable light can be shed
on policy questions in the area of spectrum allocation by the combination of models
from information theory and economics. We have focused on several issues that
11Indepen (2004) acknowledge that in principle costs and bene¯ts of reallocation of spectrum
through relaxing constraints imposed by harmonisation should be measured with respect to their
impact on consumer and producer surplus. Our free-entry condition drives the latter to zero and
so does not feature in the calculations. In that study costs are used as a proxy for the impact on
welfare only where suitable data on consumer surplus is lacking.
31we believe are central to existing work by economists in this area. Our approach
complements this literature by o®ering rigorous modelling of the issues identi¯ed,
whilst advancing it by the multidisciplinary approach adopted. We believe this
approach has yielded insights both for policymakers and for how the literature might
be developed in order to strengthen these.
Perhaps one way to test this claim is to consider whether a useful research agenda
has emerged from our work. We believe that this is the case. First, there are im-
portant questions of implementation|as we believe is also true of the existing AIP
methodology. In particular, the introduction of consumer surplus and foregone dis-
tortionary taxes leading to Ramsey-type licence prices places additional emphasis on
demand studies. The full implementation of our proposed procedure would require
estimation of cost functions sector-by-sector.
Second, an important development would follow naturally from our framework.
We focus on allocative and productive e±ciency, thus ignoring dynamic (intertem-
poral) incentives/e±ciency: in particular, for investment in spectrum-e±cient tech-
nologies. In such a development, it would be socially optimal for investment to take
place in settings where interference graphs are dense|so as to free up spectrum for
re-use around the graph. Yet it seems almost certain that ¯rms will not be able to
appropriate all of the gains from such investment, thus rendering their investment
decisions suboptimal. A natural way to encourage such investment would be to
charge high spectrum prices where interference is greatest but this con°icts with
the optimal static AIPs, as described above|recall Figure 7. Thus, the question of
encouraging static and dynamic e±ciency needs signi¯cant future research, within
a model that explicitly incorporates aspects of the underlying engineering problem.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Using (7) we may write (11) as
¦ = ¦(a;N) =
P(a;N)D(P(a;N)
²N2 ¡ F (A.1)







@a < 0 if PD0 + D < 0 ie ² > 1.






















P[(2N ¡ 1)² ¡ 1]
N3(²N ¡ 1)
(A.5)
33Since we assume that ² > 1 we have that (2N ¡ 1)² > N(² ¡ 1) > 0 for N ¸ 1. It
follows that @¦
@N < 0.
34Figure 1: A 4-Node Graph of 4 Markets





Figure 3: Single Edge and Two Edge Graphs




























Figure 4: The Optimal Licence Price and Firm Numbers: ¤ = 0:3, `i = 3,
¹ = 3c. X=sector with spectrum re-use. Y=sector without spectrum
re-use.





















SPECTRUM RE−USE PARAMETER k
number of firms (N) 
retail price (P) 
licence price (a) 
Figure 5: The Optimal Licence Price and Spectrum Re-Use: ¤ = 0:3,¹ = 3c.
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Figure 6: The Optimal Licence Price and Spectrum Re-Use: ¤ = 0:3, ¹ = 0.






















retail price (P) 
licence price (a) 
number of firms (N) 
Figure 7: The Optimal Licence Price and Elasticity of Demand (²): ¤ = 0:3,
¹ = 3c, `i = 3.




























Figure 8: The Constrained Optimal Licence Price and Firm Numbers: ¤ =
¡1, `i = 3. X=sector with spectrum re-use. Y=sector without spectrum
re-use.
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Figure 9: The Constrained Optimal Licence Price Elasticity of Demand
(²): ¤ = ¡1, ¹ = 3c, `i = 3.




















Figure 10: Dynamic Adjustment. a¤
i = 1; ai(0) = 0.
40